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1. Introduction
A persistent and extremely surprising empirical result in the international trade litera-
ture is the existence of rather strong ‘border effects.’ The conundrum consists of the fact
that intra-national trade is typically found to be a multiple of international trade, even
after controlling for a diverse array of barriers such as distance, economic size, explicit trade
obstacles and a host of other country specific characteristics, such as common language,
adjacency, remoteness or alternative trading opportunities. The seminal study by McCal-
lum (1995) compares trade among Canadian provinces relative to corresponding flows with
American states for 1988, in a gravity equation framework and using aggregate trade vol-
umes. The key finding is that inter-provincial trade is roughly twenty times larger than
flows between provinces and states. Subsequent studies have generally found border effects
of smaller but comparable magnitudes in North America and Europe.1 In a much cited
paper, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) view McCallum’s results as one of the six major puzzles
in international macroeconomics.
The key contribution of this study stems from our construction of a comprehensive in-
dustry specific (at the three digit NAICS level) database that covers intra-national and
international trade flows between 1992-2005 within Canada, and between Canada and the
United States. By incorporating state-to-state trade volumes, in addition to province-to-
province and province-to-state flows, these data allow us to analyze the effects of borders
in international trade from a dual perspective. The long time-series of our data is also
important as most studies have typically relied on single year cross-sections. The use of dis-
aggregated industry level data over multiple years enables us to reliably assess the existence,
1 See Helliwell and McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1998), Wei (1996), Head and Mayer (2000), Nitsch
(2000), Hillberry (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Evans (2003 and 2006), and Chen (2004 and
2011). Particularly notable are estimates by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) that reduce Canada’s
borders effects to a range between 14 and 16. See the Appendix for a slightly more detailed review of this
literature.
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persistence and variability of border effects across sectors, and to control for potentially con-
founding year specific shocks. Exclusive reliance on aggregate trade effectively imposes a
uniform response not only of province-state pairs, but also across trading sectors of the two
economies. Perhaps more importantly, the time span of these data allows us to evaluate the
effects of two significant shocks that theoretically should have impacted the magnitude of
border effects between Canada and the United States. Specifically, the 1994 North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the increase in border security in the aftermath
of the tragic September 11, 2001 (or 9/11) events.
Why do we see any significant border effects at all? As noted by Goldfarb (2007), an
obvious consequence of enhanced border security is longer and less predictable waiting times,
which contributes to increased expenditures on variable inputs such as fuel and drivers hours,
as well as more rapid depreciation of trucks and related capital equipment. Manufacturers
might respond to possible delays by increasing average inventory levels or by sending goods
earlier in order to ensure timely arrival. Border delays are especially critical for perishable
commodities. All else being equal, border delays increase the costs of international trade
and enhances the attractiveness of domestic substitutes. The possibility of this resulting in
lower trade is evident.
Exploiting the effects of NAFTA and 9/11 may shed some light on the source, economic
nature and composition of border effects. For example, if non-tariff trade barriers are partly
responsible for the border effects, then we expect to see a decrease after NAFTA, above
and beyond the decrease recorded as a result of the 1988 Free Trade Agreement, which
largely dismantled tariff barriers. On the other hand, there also exists some evidence of
a ‘September 11’ effect in bilateral trade flows between Canada and the United States.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, a series of measures aimed at
tightening border security have been adopted, and these are largely considered to have led
to a substantial border thickening and thereby to a slowing down, if not a reversal, of closer
economic integration between Canada and the United States. Negotiations to speed up the
flow of goods and people across the border are currently under way between Canada and
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the United States. The currently proposed security perimeter and regulatory cooperation
agreement2 is aimed at promoting trade, economic growth and jobs on both sides, while
maintaining a high security level. These efforts are based on the belief that the border
thickened. However, we are unaware of any existing empirical evidence of such impacts.
This paper aims to fill this void.
The raw data certainly exhibits features of both events. Based on data from twenty-five
(three digit) NAICS level industries (predominantly in manufacturing), Figure 1 reveals
that in absolute terms, imports by Canadian provinces from the U.S. increased by roughly
100% while exports rose by over 150% over the whole period. However, both exports and
imports fell rather sharply and over a short duration following 9/11 - by almost 130% from
2000 to 2003. Subsequent years witnessed a comparable rise in trade flows comparable to
pre-2000 levels.3
Our estimates based on aggregate province-state data are consistent with recent studies,
which suggest that McCallum’s border effects are biased upwards. Furthermore, border
effects decline during the late 1990s after the signing of NAFTA. However, of considerable
interest is the significant spike in their magnitude after 2001. Results from disaggregated
three digit NAICS level data reveal larger border effects during the early 1990s, that are
closer to McCallum’s initial findings. On the other hand, the trends are consistent with
results from the aggregated data as there is a clear decline in border impacts after the
implementation of NAFTA, followed by pronounced increase after 2001. Our inference is
that the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in enhanced security measures at the U.S.-
2 For a complete picture of the recently devised Canadian ‘Border Action Plan’ see http : //goo.gl/sF iiR
(accessed September 11, 2011).
3 Globerman and Storer (2008) estimate before and after import and export equations which include
demand and exchange rate terms and report a significant and persistent effect on Canadian exports to the
US and a less persistent effect on the US exports to Canada. Employing a different specification of the time
effect, Burt (2009) finds some contrary evidence, while Globerman and Storer (2009) provide a synthesis of
the limited existing econometric evidence.
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Figure 1: Canadian Imports and Exports from/to the U.S. in nominal dollars. (Source: Statistics Canada.)
Canada border, considerably impacted trade flows between the two countries. We find
pronounced border effects with respect to Canadian exports to the U.S. as well as for
Canadian imports from the United States. Finally, our estimates reveal some heterogeneity
in border effects, that is, however, consistent with institutional details specific to each
industry.
2. Methodology
Details on data compilation and sources are contained in the Appendix. Hence we only
note the basic sources here. Three digit NAICS level Canadian province to province trade
data (1997-2005) - mostly from the manufacturing sector - were obtained from the Input-
Output Division of Statistics Canada.4 Corresponding three digit NAICS data on exports
4 The specific industries included along with the NAICS code: 114 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping; 211
Oil and Gas Extraction; 212 Mining (except Oil and Gas); 213 Support Activities for Mining and Oil and
Gas Extraction; 311 Food Manufacturing; 312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing; 313 Textile
Mills; 315 Clothing Manufacturing; 321 Wood Product Manufacturing; 322 Paper Manufacturing; 323
Printing and Related Support Activities; 324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing; 325 Chemical
Manufacturing; 327 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing; 331 Primary Metal Manufacturing; 332
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing; 333 Machinery Manufacturing; 334 Computer and Electronic
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from provinces to states (in the U.S.) and imports from states to provinces are available
from Industry Canada’s Trade Data Online database. State to state trade flows at the three
digit NAICS level are from the United States Census Bureau’s Commodity Flow Surveys.
To establish comparability with the literature, we first aggregate the data across sectors,
by province-province and province-state trade flows. The basic empirical specification is the
following gravity model:5
lnTRADEij = β0 + β1DUMPROVij + β2lnGDPi + β3lnGDPj + β4lnPOPi + β5lnPOPj
+β6lnDISTij + ǫij (1)
where ln is the natural logarithm, i refers to the originating jurisdiction and j to the
destination. TRADEij represents total exports and imports between jurisdictions i and j,
DUMPROVij is equal to 1 for interprovincial trade and 0 otherwise, GDPi (POPi) is total
GDP (population) for jurisdiction i, GDPj (POPj) is total GDP (population) for jurisdiction
j, DISTij is total distance between jurisdictions i and j and ǫij is the error term. We use
actual driving distances from Google maps, in addition to direct line distances, which have
been the norm in the literature. This is arguably a superior proxy for transportation costs,
since truck shipping is the mode of choice for a large proportion of Canada-U.S. trade.
The exponential of DUMPROVij yields the border effect. We run this regression sepa-
rately for each year from 1992-2005. Each of these regressions will be based on a maximum
of 690 annual observations consisting of 90 (10 x 9) observations for interprovincial trade
and 600 (10 x 30 x 2) observations for province-state trade.6 The dependent variable will
take a value of zero in cases where there is no trade between any jurisdictions i and j. Equa-
tion (1) is estimated using OLS and standard errors of coefficient estimates are clustered by
Product Manufacturing; 336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing; 337 Furniture and Related Product
Manufacturing; and 339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing.
5 See for example McCallum (1995).
6 Following the existing literature, our dataset includes the 10 Canadian provinces and the 30 US states
most active in bi-lateral exchanges. Please refer to the Appendix for a listing of the included jurisdictions.
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originating jurisdiction, in order to account for unobserved correlations that might impact
trade flows specific to the jurisdiction.7
This is the standard approach used by studies that have relied on interprovincial and
province-state trade flows. We augment this specification by also employing data on state
to state trade flows. Therefore, the empirical specification becomes:
lnTRADEij = β0 + β1DUMPROVij + β2INTERSTATEij + β3lnGDPi + β4lnGDPj
+β5lnPOPi + β6lnPOPj + β7lnDISTij + ǫij (2)
where DUMPROVij is equal to 1 for inter-provincial trade flows and is 0 otherwise, while
INTERSTATEij is 1 for state to state trade flows and is 0 otherwise. Therefore, consistent
with (1), the omitted category is province-state trade flows. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) estimate a similar specification with 1993 data. In contrast, we incorporate the 1993,
1997 and 2002 Commodity Flow Survey waves. Given our specific focus on the effects of
NAFTA and the September 11, 2001, including these data is important in order to provide
a dual perspective on the issues. The data allows us to evaluate whether border effects
are unilateral or bilateral. We run equation (2) separately for each year of available data
(1993, 1997 and 2002) in order to estimate border effects over time. Therefore, regressions
are based on a sample of 90 (10 x 9) observations for interprovincial trade, 600 (l0 x 30 x
2) observations for province-state trade, and 870 (30 x 29) observations for interstate trade
(for the three years of availability), resulting in a maximum sample of 1,560 observations
annually. As in (1) above, we use OLS to estimates equation (2) and standard errors are
clustered by originating jurisdiction.8
While useful for assessing the overall magnitude of border resistance, the above method-
ologies do not allow to properly identify the source of the border effect and understand
which industries are differentially impacted. Therefore, we run the specifications with three
digit level NAICS data. Employing these data also enables us to use dummies for the orig-
7 The relevant summary statistics are provided in the Appendix, Table 1a.
8 The relevant summary statistics are provided in the Appendix, Table 2a.
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inating and destination jurisdictions i and j even if the regression is based on a single year.
These regressions are important given the reliance of most studies on aggregate trade flow
data from a single year, which does not shed any light on potential industry specific sources
of border effects as well as possibly being confounded by unobserved jurisdiction and year
specific shocks.
Single year regressions with respect to 21 three-digit level NAICS codes without inter-
state trade data are based on a maximum of 1,890 (10 x 9 x 21) observations for interprovin-
cial trade and 1,260 (21 x l0 x 30 x 2) observations for province-state trade resulting in a
sample of 3,150 observations. The use of interstate data adds a further 18,270 (30 x 29 x 21)
observations. However, there are a number of zero observations with disaggregated data,
since a number of jurisdictions do not trade with each other in a variety of goods and ser-
vices. There is a possibility that underlying and unobserved characteristics specific to such
jurisdictions determine the existence (or lack) of significant trade flows. Moreover, the data
collecting agencies (e.g. Statistics Canada, Industry Canada and the US Census Bureau)
only record ‘significant’ flows of goods, which implies that a zero in the data may reflect
either no trade or shipments, or trade and shipments below an arbitrary threshold.9 Given
this, the use of truncated regression models10 are appropriate for estimating equations (1)
and (2) when using three digit NAICS data. Summary statistics of these data are available
in the Appendix, Table 3a. The first estimable framework then becomes:
lnTRADEijk = β0 + β1DUMPROVij + β2lnGDPi + β3lnGDPj + β4lnPOPi + β5lnPOPj
+β6lnDISTij +
∑
i
PROVi +
∑
k
NAICSk + ǫijk (3)
if TRADEijk > threshold and where k refers to the specific three digit NAICS indus-
9 Depending on the dataset used and according to the documentation obtained from the data provides,
the truncation level with respect to trade flows in a particular industry is defined as equal to $100,000 for
inter-provincial and province-states trade, and $1 million for state-state trade.
10 The Stata command truncreg uses the normality assumption of the entire population to fit a regression
model using a sample drawn from the restricted part of the population. See e.g. Wooldridge (2003), p. 579.
8
try.
∑
i PROVi represents dummies for the originating province and
∑
kNAICSk refers to
NAICS level dummies. Therefore, border effects are identified here by exploiting variation
across trade flows between provinces and provinces to states, while holding constant unob-
served shocks specific to an originating province and industry. In these regressions, standard
errors of coefficient estimates are clustered by industry and the originating jurisdiction.
3. Empirical Estimates
3.1. Regressions based on aggregate provincial and state level trade flows
Table 1 contains baseline OLS estimates of the border effect for each year from 1992-
2005, based on equation (1). The exponential of the coefficient estimate of DUMPROVij is
reported beneath the associated coefficient. Our results are comparable to Helliwell (1998)
and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and reveal border effects from 9 to 11 between 1992
and 1995. Recall that McCallum (1995) obtain a border effect of 22 based on 1988 data
and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggest a border effect of 10.7 using 1993 data. We
obtain an almost identical estimate of 10.8 from 1992 data and border effects ranging from
9 to 10 for 1993-1995.
In contrast, the border effect for 1997 is relatively larger at 14 but remains stable
otherwise at roughly 12 until 2000. While the increase in border effects after the signing of
NAFTA in 1994 might seem paradoxical, the result is consistent with Helliwell (1998) who
also finds an increase in border effects immediately after the Free Trade Agreement of 1987
and a corresponding decrease only 3 years later, and could be explained by the time lag
necessary for trade pattern adjustments (Helliwell (1998), p. 22). On the other hand, there
is a clear increase from 2001 onwards, rising to more than 17 in 2003 and 2004 and more
than 19 in 2005. All border effect coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the
1% level. In terms of other covariates, the GDP of originating and destination jurisdictions
possess the expected positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The
coefficient estimates of distance are close to unity, also significant at the 1% level (across
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
               
interprov 2.38*** 2.24*** 2.23*** 2.34*** 2.41*** 2.65*** 2.50*** 2.50*** 2.48*** 2.55*** 2.70*** 2.85*** 2.85*** 2.95*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
border effect 10.80 9.39 9.30 10.38 11.13 14.15 12.18 12.18 11.94 12.81 14.88 17.29 17.29 19.11 
ln(orig_gdp) 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.17*** 1.14*** 1.12*** 1.09*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.05*** 1.02*** 1.05*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) 
ln(dest_gdp) 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.96*** 1.01*** 1.03*** 0.96*** 0.95*** 1.00*** 1.04*** 1.01*** 1.04*** 1.03*** 1.05*** 1.12*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.043) 
ln(dr_dist) -1.36*** -1.39*** -1.41*** -1.41*** -1.40*** -1.37*** -1.34*** -1.35*** -1.33*** -1.32*** -1.42*** -1.40*** -1.37*** -1.50*** 
 (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.080) 
Constant -26.2*** -25.7*** -25.7*** -26.9*** -26.5*** -24.3*** -23.6*** -24.0*** -24.1*** -23.2*** -24.1*** -24.0*** -23.9*** -25.5*** 
 (1.67) (1.60) (1.71) (1.56) (1.60) (1.54) (1.53) (1.60) (1.49) (1.57) (1.55) (1.55) (1.58) (1.70) 
Obs 680 682 681 684 680 686 683 685 686 687 688 685 686 686 
R-squared 0.745 0.737 0.743 0.770 0.771 0.770 0.778 0.782 0.788 0.781 0.798 0.792 0.784 0.749 
Notes: Province-province and province-state trade flows included, inter-provincial dummy (interprov). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
adjusted trade flows (l_atrade). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by origin-destination: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1: OLS Estimates of Inter-provincial Border Effects from 1992 to 2005, Aggregate Data. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry
Canada.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1993 1997 2002 1993 1997 2002 
       
interprov 2.29*** 2.79*** 2.80*** 2.17*** 2.85*** 2.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) 
border effect 9.87 16.28 16.44 8.76 17.29 15.80 
interstate 0.56*** -0.21*** -0.43*** 0.67*** -0.27*** -0.40*** 
 (0.070) (0.065) (0.069) (0.078) (0.071) (0.073) 
border effect 1.75 0.81 0.65 1.95 0.76 0.67 
ln(orig_gdp) 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.09*** 1.00*** 1.86*** 0.45** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.31) (0.26) (0.23) 
ln(dest_gdp) 1.01*** 1.10*** 1.14*** -0.29 1.11*** 1.05*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.29) (0.23) (0.23) 
ln(drdist) -1.16*** -1.23*** -1.29*** -1.17*** -1.23*** -1.29*** 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) 
ln(orig_pop)    0.19 -0.77*** 0.69*** 
    (0.33) (0.27) (0.25) 
ln(dest_pop)    1.44*** -0.0054 0.089 
    (0.32) (0.25) (0.25) 
Constant -28.3*** -29.4*** -28.2*** -15.2*** -35.7*** -21.5*** 
 (1.10) (1.12) (1.15) (4.24) (3.52) (3.33) 
Obs 1521 1507 1467 1521 1507 1467 
R-squared 0.808 0.819 0.811 0.812 0.820 0.812 
Notes: Province-province and province-state trade flows included, inter-provincial and inter-   
state dummies (interprov and interstate). The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the adjusted trade flows (l_atrade). Standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by origin-destination, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 2: OLS Estimates of Inter-provincial and Inter-state Border Effects from 1992 to 2005, Aggregate Data. (Source: Statistics Canada,
Industry Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
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all columns) and have the expected negative signs. Population levels in the originating and
destination jurisdictions are sporadically significant with no clear patterns.
Table 2 consists of border effects estimates of equation (2), which incorporate interstate
trade flows. The estimates are for 1993, 1997 and 2002 only, due to the US data availability
discussed above. Given this, it is not possible to evaluate directly whether border effects
decreased right after NAFTA came into force or whether they increased in magnitude pre-
cisely from 2001 onward. However, the estimates are consistent in size to the results in
Table 1. Columns 1-3 contain estimates that do not control for population of origin and
final destinations, while results in columns 4 -6 are conditioned on population. Border effect
estimates are quite similar to corresponding figures discussed previously. Specifically, the
border effect estimates for 1993, 1997, and 2002 from Table 1 are approximately 9, 14, and
15. By comparison, the estimates for the same years from columns 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2
are roughly 9, 17, and 16, respectively. All these coefficient estimates are statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level. Coefficient estimates of interstate trade (INTERSTATEij) are also
significant at the 1% level across all columns with different signs. Origin and destination
GDP are also significant across all columns with positive signs, and distance is negative and
significant at the 1% level.
As expected, the estimates based on 1993 data parallel findings from Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003). First, our border effect of 9.87 in column 1 is only slightly lower
than their estimate of 10.7. Second, our estimate of the difference in interstate trade flows
relative to province-state trade (INTERSTATEij) is 1.75, which is only slightly larger
than their result of 1.5. As a further sensitivity analysis, we re-ran the regressions in Tables
1 and 2, but using difference - in - difference specifications that condition border effect
estimates on unobserved time specific shocks through year specific dummies. Employing
difference-in-difference models yields separate border effects for each year but also has the
advantage of allowing us to employ province (state) and year fixed effects in order to control
for unobserved shocks that are fixed within jurisdictions over time or simultaneously impact
all provinces and states in a given year.
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Equation (1) thus becomes:
lnTRADEij = β0 + β1DUMPROVijt + β2(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1994t)
+β3(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1995t) + β4(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1996t)
+β5(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1997t) + β6(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1998t)
+β7(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1999t) + β8(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2000t)
+β9(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2001t) + β10(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2002t)
+β11(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2003t) + β12(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2004t)
+β13(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2005t) + β14lnGDPi + β15lnGDPj
+β16lnPOPi + β17lnPOPj + β18lnDISTij +
∑
i
ORIGi +
∑
t
Y EARt + ǫij (4)
where the t subscript denotes the year. β1 now yields the border effect for 1993 and the
other coefficients (β2 through β13) measure the incremental border effect for each subsequent
year.
∑
iORIGi represents originating province dummies and
∑
t Y EARt are year specific
dummies. Equation (2) is also modified as:
lnTRADEij = β0 + β1DUMPROVijt + β2(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR1997t)
+β3(DUMPROVijt ∗ Y EAR2002t) + β4INTERSTATEijt
+β5(INTERSTATEijt ∗ Y EAR1997t) + β6(INTERSTATEijt ∗ Y EAR2002t)
+β7lnGDPi + β8lnGDPj + β9lnPOPi + β10lnPOPj
+β11lnDISTij +
∑
i
ORIGi +
∑
t
Y EARt + ǫij (5)
β4 is the benchmark effect for interstate flows for 1992 and the other coefficients (β5, β6)
measure the incremental impacts for each subsequent year. In both specifications, standard
errors are clustered by origin and destination in order to account for unobserved jurisdiction-
level correlations.
Table 3 contains OLS estimates of equations (4) and (5) for the aggregate data pooled for
all available years. For the sake of brevity we do not report all interaction coefficients. The
12
figures and trends for the year*border interaction terms are quite similar to those contained
in Tables 1 and 2. Estimates reveal ‘Canadian-side’ border effects ranging from around 10
in 1992-93, roughly 9.5 in 1994, increasing until 1997 to around 16 and declining thereafter
to about 14 in 2001. From 2001 onward, we again witness a significant increase to about 19
in 2004/2005. Regressions based on (5) and also including state to state data yield ‘US-side’
border effects for 1992, 1997 and 2002 comparable to previous results.
Next, we further augment the gravity specification with remoteness measures. The need
to control for remoteness stems from interpreting the border effect on trade as a bilateral
trade barrier relative to the average trade barrier of the two countries with all of their third
trading partners (Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), p. 170). The recent literature on
border effects suggests several ways to control for these third-party effects.11 We follow
most of the literature (including Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), p. 174) in defining the
remoteness of a country i as a weighted average of the distances to all of its trading partners
other than j, where the weights are the respective partners GDP levels. This is calculated for
both the exporter and the importer for every year and the remoteness variables are included
as controls. As expected, both remoteness coefficients are positive (third-party remoteness
increases bilateral trade) and statistically significant at the 1% level for all years, and their
magnitude is consistent with other studies (e.g. Helliwell (1998), p.44). More importantly,
as can be seen by comparing the results in Table 4 with those in Table 1, accounting for
remoteness does reduce the border effect by a modest, but not significant margin, which is
again consistent with the literature.
A more comprehensive method in addressing the trading resistance factor in bilateral
trade consists in controlling for multilateral resistance terms (MRTs). These are price indices
which are functions of all bilateral trade barriers on both the exporter and the importer sides.
11 One method to account for ‘trading resistance’ assumes that the most important barrier to trade is
distance itself, and attempts to control for the opportunity cost of trade using various indicators of the
remoteness of both trading partners.
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VARIABLES     Inter-province and province-state data      
 overall 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
interprov 2.42*** -0.14 -0.16 -0.079 0.0018 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.33 0.49 0.5 0.54 
 (0.16) -0.046 -0.086 -0.079 -0.1 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 
implied border effect 11.25 9.78 9.58 10.39 11.27 15.80 13.87 13.60 12.94 14.15 15.64 18.36 18.54 19.30 
year dummies yes              
origin dummies yes              
year*border yes              
Constant -32.4***              
 (4.31)              
Observations 9579              
R-squared 0.778              
                          Inter-province, province-state and state-state data  
interprov 2.43***     0.17     0.16    
 (0.11)     -0.06     -0.056    
implied border effect 11.36     13.46     13.33    
interstate 0.52***              
 (0.068)     -0.61     -0.78    
implied border effect 1.68     -0.048     -0.056    
year dummies yes              
origin dummies yes              
year*border yes              
Constant 20.4***              
 (5.51)              
Observations 12018              
R-squared 0.815              
Notes: Province-province and province-state trade flows included, inter-provincial and inter-state dummies (interprov and    
           interstate). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the adjusted trade flows (l_atrade). The yearly   
           border effect is calculated as algebraic sum between the overall and border-year interaction coefficients Standard errors in   
                    parentheses, clustered by origin-destination, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3: OLS Estimates of Inter-provincial and Inter-state Border Effects from 1992 to 2005, with Year and Jurisdiction Dummies, Pooled
Aggregate Data. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
               
interprov 2.34*** 2.13*** 2.18*** 2.29*** 2.35*** 2.86*** 2.46*** 2.46*** 2.44*** 2.51*** 2.91*** 2.80*** 2.79*** 2.90*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.099) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
border effect 10.38 8.41 8.85 9.87 10.48 17.46 11.7 11.7 11.47 12.3 18.36 16.44 16.28 18.17 
ln(orig_gdp) 1.18*** 1.17*** 1.13*** 1.12*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.05*** 1.02*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 
 (0.039) (0.027) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) 
ln(dest_gdp) 0.85*** 0.99*** 0.89*** 0.93*** 0.95*** 1.01*** 0.88*** 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 1.03*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 1.04*** 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.038) (0.033) (0.035) (0.026) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) 
ln(dr_dist) -1.56*** -1.46*** -1.61*** -1.61*** -1.60*** -1.37*** -1.51*** -1.52*** -1.50*** -1.48*** -1.35*** -1.57*** -1.55*** -1.70*** 
 (0.086) (0.045) (0.089) (0.085) (0.085) (0.043) (0.080) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.043) (0.081) (0.081) (0.088) 
ln(rem_exp) 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.33*** 0.66*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 (0.13) (0.097) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.084) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.092) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
ln(rem_imp) 0.65*** 0.83*** 0.61*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.49*** 0.68*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.56*** 
 (0.13) (0.097) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.090) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.094) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Constant -22.4*** -26.4*** -21.5*** -22.4*** -22.0*** -25.2*** -19.6*** -20.1*** -20.1*** -19.4*** -23.3*** -19.5*** -19.1*** -20.1*** 
 (1.66) (1.06) (1.67) (1.58) (1.62) (1.13) (1.60) (1.63) (1.60) (1.66) (1.16) (1.67) (1.73) (1.76) 
Obs 680 1521 681 684 680 1507 683 685 686 687 1467 685 686 686 
R-squared 0.759 0.817 0.759 0.786 0.787 0.828 0.791 0.795 0.800 0.793 0.814 0.806 0.798 0.764 
Notes: Province-province and province-state trade flows included, inter-provincial and inter-state dummies (interprov and interstate). The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the adjusted trade flows (l_atrade). Remoteness dummies are calculated for each respective year. Standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by origin-destination, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: OLS Estimates of Inter-provincial Border Effects from 1992 to 2005, with Remoteness Control, Pooled Aggregate Data. (Source:
Statistics Canada, Industry Canada.)
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On the other hand, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out (p. 179) these terms
are not observables, and the relatively involved numerical approximation and non-linear
estimation procedure has led to a low rate of adoption of the method in subsequent papers.
However, we acknowledge that controlling for the multilateral resistance terms is important
for establishing the robustness of our results.
To this end we use a custom Stata program12, which solves the non-linear system ana-
lytically and has several advantages beyond user-friendliness over the original procedure.
The method yields a reduced form log-linear gravity equation which can be estimated using
standard econometric techniques. The first column in Table 4a in the Appendix presents the
summarized results using the Anderson and van Wincoop structural estimation procedure,
while the second column is a comparable reduced form model, using origin and destination
fixed effects. Comparing the two sets of results, it can be observed that, while this particular
expression of the border coefficient13 is reduced when controlling for the theoretically-sound
multilateral resistance terms, the difference when compared to the simple OLS model in-
cluding origin/destination dummies, is not substantial.14 Hence, the differences between
our jurisdiction-dummy estimations above and the theoretically-sound structural parameter
estimates is not likely to be large.
3.2. Regressions based on NAICS level disaggregated data
Table 5 contains empirical estimates of equation (3) based on three-digit level NAICS
data and employing truncated regression models. Relative to previous estimates based
on aggregate province-state data, there are differences in the magnitude of border effects.
Specifically, we now obtain border effects ranging from 17 to 20 from 1992 to 1996, all of
which are statistically significant at the 1% level and much larger than estimates in Tables
12 The code for avwtransform.ado was written by Bas Straathof and is described in Straathof (2008).
13 Note that the use of structural estimation precludes a directly comparable border effect estimate relative
to our earlier results.
14 Similarly, Balistreri and Hillberry (2007) show that structurally estimating Canadian border effects
with Canadian data only reduces the OLS estimates by a modest amount.
15
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
               
interprov 2.89*** 2.83*** 2.91*** 2.99*** 3.03*** 2.40*** 2.33*** 2.27*** 2.37*** 2.33*** 2.41*** 2.62*** 2.63*** 2.63*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.100) (0.097) (0.092) (0.085) (0.084) (0.081) (0.082) (0.080) (0.084) (0.085) (0.083) 
border effects 17.99 16.94 18.36 19.86 20.7 11.03 10.28 9.68 10.7 10.28 11.13 13.73 13.87 13.87 
ln(orig_gdp) 0.39 0.31 0.17 0.26 0.39* 0.67*** 0.50** 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.080 -0.014 0.076 0.26 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) 
ln(dest_gdp) 1.28*** 1.21*** 1.53*** 1.70*** 1.61*** 1.70*** 1.90*** 2.09*** 2.02*** 1.88*** 2.21*** 2.02*** 1.92*** 1.84*** 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
ln(dr_dist) -0.98*** -1.03*** -1.05*** -1.05*** -1.06*** -1.18*** -1.17*** -1.16*** -1.21*** -1.21*** -1.21*** -1.24*** -1.23*** -1.26*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) 
ln(orig_pop) 0.64** 0.73*** 0.90*** 0.79*** 0.64*** 0.41* 0.59** 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.97*** 1.12*** 0.97*** 0.78*** 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.19) 
ln(dest_pop) -0.67** -0.58* -0.92*** -1.05*** -0.96*** -1.04*** -1.24*** -1.47*** -1.35*** -1.18*** -1.54*** -1.31*** -1.21*** -1.10*** 
 (0.33) (0.30) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) 
Constant -19.4*** -17.9*** -19.9*** -22.8*** -22.9*** -26.7*** -27.3*** -25.9*** -25.3*** -23.7*** -25.6*** -24.1*** -23.3*** -24.5*** 
 (4.07) (3.70) (3.41) (3.42) (3.30) (3.04) (3.27) (3.15) (2.61) (2.88) (3.16) (3.10) (2.87) (2.66) 
Obs 7110 7284 7411 7502 7561 8747 8915 9186 9037 9158 9008 9107 8921 8949 
Notes: Province-province and province-state trade flows included, inter-provincial and inter-state dummies (interprov and interstate). The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the adjusted trade flows (l_atrade). Truncated regressions (at 100,000 CAD). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by origin-
destination, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Truncated Regression Estimation of Inter-provincial Border Effects from 1992 to 2005, NAICS-level Data. (Source: Statistics
Canada, Industry Canada.)
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1 and 2, which suggest a border effect of around 10. On the other hand, the trends outlined
above are maintained: there is a sharp decrease in border effects from 1997 to 2001, with
estimates from 10 to 12 that are consistent with findings based on aggregate data. Finally,
as was the case with aggregate data, we observe an increase in border effects to 12-15.8 from
2002-2005. Several additional robustness checks, including the use of NAICS level dummies
confirm the results.15
The estimates from NAICS level data certainly correspond with ex-ante intuition as
they suggest a sharp drop in border effects following NAFTA. However, why should border
effects based on industry level data be larger in magnitude than corresponding results from
aggregate province-state data?16 A tentative answer is based on the prevalence of zero flows
in the data and their distribution between national and international flows. Specifically, for
some products there exists only state-province trade and no state-state trade. Collapsing
various NAICS codes to obtain the aggregate measure, results in increasing inter-country
trade, leading to a lower border effect estimate. When performing the disaggregated analysis
however, all of these zero flows will actually drop out of the industry-level sample. Conse-
quently, the implied border effect may appear magnified. Therefore the extensive margin of
trade and the effect of aggregation present a possible explanation for the difference.
3.3. Sources of Border Effects
In order to shed some more light on the source of border effects, we ran our simple baseline
regression (equation 1) separately for imports and exports by and from Canadian provinces
to the United States. Coefficient estimates of border effects are statistically significant
(at the 1% level) with respect to both exports and imports. For the sake of brevity, we
summarize the regression results in Figure 2, which graphs the border effects over time.
Initially, border effects for Canadian exports are larger in magnitude. In contrast, border
15 Detailed results are available upon request.
16 As mentioned previously, Hillberry (2002) suggests the converse could be true. In contrast, we obtain
larger effects when using disaggregated data.
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Figure 2: OLS Estimates of Interprovincial Border Effects 1992-2005 based on Aggregate Data. (Source:
Statistics Canada, Industry Canada.)
effects for imports exceed corresponding impacts for exports from the mid-1990s onwards.
However, border effects for both exports and imports closely parallel each other over time
and are consistent with the broad trends outlined in the previous regressions. Specifically,
there is a clear decline in border effects following NAFTA, succeeded by a post 9-11 increase.
In other words, firms on both sides of the border experienced similar costs.!
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Figure 3: OLS Estimates of Interprovincial Border Effects by Industry (1992-2005) based on Aggregate
Data. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry Canada.)
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate regression estimates (also based on a specification resembling
18
equation (1)) for the 11 industries with the highest average border effects.17 18 The results
in figure 3 demonstrate considerable heterogeneity across industries. For example, food
manufacturing has the highest border effect in the early 1990s, but then experienced a rapid
decline during the mid and later part of the decade, probably because of the decline in tariffs
generated by NAFTA. Further, there is no strong post 9-11 effect. In contrast, there is a
significant spike in border effects for beverage and tobacco in the mid-1990s followed by a
rather sharp decline and then a more or less constant trend until 9-11.
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Figure 4: OLS Estimates of Interprovincial Border Effects by Industry (1992-2005) based on Aggregate
Data. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry Canada.)
These results are consistent with industry specific policies. In the early 1990s, Canadian
cigarettes were extremely expensive relative to comparable U.S. products because of high
excise taxes.19 However, federal and provincial governments significantly reduced taxes dur-
ing the mid-1990s in order to stop the flow of cross-border smuggling from the United States.
As a result, Canadian tobacco products became cheaper and attractive for U.S. importers.
17 The complete results are available upon request. Most of the border effects reported in figures 3 and
4 are statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% levels.
18 These industries constitute a significant amount of province-province and province-state trade. For
example, in 2000 these industries accounted for 25% of trade.
19 See Gruber, Sen, and Stabile (2003) for further details.
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On the other hand, border effects remained stable for much of the 1990s for petroleum
products, which is unsurprising given the low tariffs on these products even before NAFTA.
However, a significant increase is visible post 9-11. This result does again correspond with
our intuition. Retail demand for gasoline has to be met rapidly and any cross-border de-
lays may be extremely expensive for refiners. Printing and the other industries in figure 4
demonstrate very similar results. In summary, there is evidence of a post NAFTA decline
followed by a 9-11 increase in the restrictive effect of borders on trade flows.
Table 6 offers further evidence that buttress the above results. Specifically, the table
contains the proportion of aggregate trade flows by province-province and province-state
for the sample endpoints 1992, 2005 and midpoint 2000. The proportion of province-state
trade with respect to food manufacturing grew from 38% in 1992 to roughly to 45% (42%)
in 2000 (2005) which is consistent with the fall in international tariffs over the same period.
Similarly, there has been an increase in province-state trade in beverage and tobacco, which
coincided with the drop in Canadian tobacco taxes over time. Specifically, while interna-
tional trade constituted roughly 40% of the total in 1992, the corresponding statistic in 2005
was 46%.
The above discussion confirms that not all industries conform to the ‘on-average’ esti-
mates of border effects in previous tables that suggest a post NAFTA dip succeeded by a
subsequent 9-11 increase. However, border effects for these industries do seem to correspond
with other institutional changes that occurred over the same time period. Moreover, results
from the seven industries illustrated in figure 4 show that border effects for most industries
are in fact consistent with our ‘on-average’ findings. In summary, this industry - specific
analysis yields some further reassurance on the robustness of our findings and that they are
not confounded by unobserved jurisdiction or year specific shocks.
4. Conclusion
The broad objective of our research is to shed some more light on the ‘black box’ of border
effects in international trade flows between Canada and the U.S. Unlike most comparable
20
Proportions (%) 1992 intl domestic 1993 2000 intl domestic 2005 intl domestic 
114     Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.24 0.18 0.06 
333     Machinery Manufacturing 7.04 6.30 0.74 0.92 7.38 6.72 0.66 5.65 4.84 0.81 
339     Miscellaneous Manufacturing 3.19 2.52 0.67 7.92 3.44 2.95 0.49 3.06 2.42 0.65 
334     Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing 6.67 5.56 1.11 1.08 8.69 8.03 0.66 5.00 4.35 0.65 
336     Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing 28.15 25.56 2.59 18.33 27.87 26.23 1.64 24.19 22.58 1.61 
212     Mining (except Oil and Gas) 1.37 1.07 0.30 0.71 0.87 0.69 0.18 1.21 0.79 0.42 
322     Paper Manufacturing 4.81 3.63 1.19 0.58 4.75 3.77 0.98 4.19 3.06 1.13 
327     Non-Metallic Mineral Product 
Manufacturing 2.48 1.00 1.48 1.83 1.46 1.15 0.31 1.29 0.84 0.45 
321     Wood Product Manufacturing 2.56 1.89 0.67 2.13 3.11 2.46 0.66 3.55 2.58 0.97 
337     Furniture and Related Product 
Manufacturing 1.07 0.63 0.44 1.67 1.59 1.23 0.36 1.40 1.11 0.29 
313     Textile Mills 1.59 0.85 0.74 0.19 1.49 1.16 0.33 1.18 0.90 0.27 
331     Primary Metal Manufacturing 4.81 3.26 1.56 0.58 4.75 3.44 1.31 5.32 4.03 1.29 
211     Oil and Gas Extraction 5.56 3.70 1.85 0.71 8.03 6.23 1.80 13.87 10.97 2.90 
332     Fabricated Metal Product 
Manufacturing 3.00 1.81 1.19 15.42 3.61 2.62 0.98 2.90 1.77 1.13 
325     Chemical Manufacturing 8.52 4.81 3.70 13.75 8.20 5.90 2.30 9.84 7.1 2.74 
315     Clothing Manufacturing 3.30 1.44 1.85 0.41 3.28 2.46 0.82 2.74 1.93 0.81 
324     Petroleum and Coal Products 
Manufacturing 2.78 1.41 1.37 1.67 2.79 1.46 1.33 5.48 2.74 2.74 
323     Printing and Related Support 
Activities 1.85 0.96 0.89 0.23 1.25 0.70 0.54 1.32 0.63 0.69 
312     Beverage and Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing 1.30 0.52 0.78 0.58 1.08 0.48 0.61 0.84 0.39 0.45 
311     Food Manufacturing 7.78 2.96 4.81 16.67 6.07 2.79 3.28 6.77 2.90 3.87 
           
 
Note:  Intl columns show the absolute value of Can-US flows. Domestic columns show Canadian province to province flows.  
Figures expressed in (e+10). 
Table 6: Proportions of total Canadian and US intranational and international trade, by NAICS. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry
Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
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studies, we do not exclusively rely on aggregate data but we also evaluate border effects at the
three digit NAICS level. Specifically, we employ industry level panel data on domestic and
cross border trade flows between Canada and the United States from 1992-2005. The long
time span of our data allows us to identify border effects through the enactment of NAFTA
and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both of which impacted trade flows for very different reasons.
The disaggregate nature of the data enables us to evaluate which industries experienced the
most significant border effects. We are also able to condition our estimates with the use of
province/state specific controls and year dummies. In other words, our dataset allows us to
expand the analysis of border effects further beyond what most existing studies based on
aggregate data with very limited time-series variation have managed to achieve.
A wide array of regressions based on many different empirical specifications and varying
levels of aggregation not only confirm the existence of border effects in U.S.-Canada trade,
but more importantly they also reveal similar trends through time in bilateral Canada-US
border effects. There is a visible decrease in border effects after the enactment of NAFTA,
and an upward spike up after the 9/11 attacks. While there is some heterogeneity in border
effects across industries, a majority correspond with these broad trends. Those that do not,
exhibit border effects which are consistent with specific institutional details. Finally, border
effects are apparent for exports from Canadian provinces as well as for imports.
Our findings suggest that NAFTA did accomplish its trade facilitation objectives. How-
ever, the reduction in border effects was reversed with 9/11 which resulted in increased
security and enhanced travel restrictions between Canada and the United States. The im-
plication is that there was a loss of trade and associated costs on both sides of the border.
We believe that our results are of contemporary relevance given the current discussions be-
tween the two countries on measures designed to reduce cross-border delays and facilitate
mutually beneficial trade flows.
22
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Appendix
Literature Overview:
Helliwell and McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1998) offer some comparable results for
1990 and up to 1996, suggesting border effects ranging from 11 to more than 20. Wei (1996)
finds significant, but lower home bias effects for OECD countries over the period 1982-
1994. Head and Mayer (2000) evaluate the European Single Market Programme and report
significant market fragmentation in the European Union, even after the elimination of most
tariff barriers and quotas in 1968 and the establishment of the Single European Market
in 1992. Nitsch (2000) also finds substantial border effects in the European Union from
1979 to 1990. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) employ 1993 data and obtain significant
border effects, ranging from 14 to 16 for Canada. Smaller border effects on the US side
and for disaggregated data are found in Hillberry (2002), who uses state-to-state trade data
for 1993 and tries to account for potential endogenous location of industries and zero trade
flows. Evans (2003) shows that at least a fraction of the border effect is attributable to a
higher elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestically produced goods. Thus,
welfare calculations that take into account the border effects are likely overestimating the
cost of borders. Employing data on US multinationals, local and foreign affiliates, Evans
also finds that the location of production, more than the nationality of the producer, is
responsible for the border frictions. Evans (2006) asks whether the border effects are due
more to the extensive or the intensive margins in international trade. The paper assumes
firm heterogeneity in costs, leading to only a fraction of total firms to be actual exporters.
The empirical application finds that both the extensive and the intensive margins contribute
approximately equally to the border effects. Finally, a recent paper by Yi (2010) constructs
a trade model with multistage production and uses calibrations to explain about two fifths
of the border effect.
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Data Description:
Our dataset were culled from several sources. Three digit NAICS level (detailed in table
1) Canadian province to province trade flows were drawn from the matrix of interprovincial
trade produced by the Input-Output Division of Statistics Canada. The data are available
from: (1) CANSIM Table 386-001 for all provinces from 1992-1999; and (2) CANSIM Ta-
ble 386-002 for all provinces between 1997 and 2005.20 These data contain estimates of
shipments (in terms of final value added) between Canadian provinces.21
Corresponding three digit NAICS data on exports from provinces to states (in the U.S.)
and imports from states to provinces were obtained from Industry Canadas Trade Data
Online database.22 Following McCallum (1995) and most subsequent studies, we include
thirty states (the twenty with the largest population and all Canada-US border states),
accounting for roughly 90% of bilateral trade.23 Also following McCallum (1995) and also
Helliwell (1996) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we apply adjustment factors to
trade flows in order to make them comparable.24
20 CANSIM Table 386-001 covering the period 1992-1999 and available online at http://goo.gl/T1kTm,
and CANSIM Table 386-002 covering the period 1997-2005, available online at http://goo.gl/9z1E.
21 There are some differences in the process of data collection between the two series. While the first
(386-0001) was conducted using the previous Standard Industrial Classification (SIC80) and the flows were
constructed on an experimental basis, the second (386-002) is based on the North American Industrial
Classification (NAICS) and the PIPES project (provincialization of all STATCAN surveys) and provides
an improved quality of details by province. In order to obtain a homogeneous sample covering the entire
period, we used the overlapping year from the second series and the growth rate in the first series itera-
tively to re-constitute the data and effectively roll-back the improved series. This procedure was based on
correspondence and advice from Statistics Canada. A similar procedure was used in the recent paper by Yi
(2010) on home bias and multi-stage production.
22 Available at http://goo.gl/pls4.
23 The thirty states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
24 Please see the Data Appendix in McCallum (1995) for a description of this procedure.
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State to state three digit NAICS data comes from the United States Census Bureaus
Commodity Flow Surveys.25 The CFS is a shipper based survey conducted every five years
as part of the Economic Census. We follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in using this
source in order to obtain equivalent data for intra-state trade exchanges and thus be able
to have a view of the border effect from the U.S. side as well. We also follow Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) in emphasizing the important caveat that this shipment data is not
obtained using the same methodology as the inter-province and province-state merchandise
trade data. Among the most notable differences, the CFS includes not just shipments
from producer to the final user, but intermediate shipments as well, and it also excludes
agricultural goods. Given these differences, the results including these data are not directly
comparable to the ones excluding state to state exchanges.26 However, given that we take a
multi-year perspective and do not focus on directly comparing border effects magnitudes for
provinces and states, the two-sided dataset is still informative. Moreover, as explained in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who compare the estimated coefficients with and without
inter-state data, there are indications that the quality of the CFS data is satisfactory for
estimating border costs.
Finally, both straight line and driving distance between state and provincial capitals
data are included in the dataset. For straight line distances, the calculations are based on
the spherical law of cosines. Driving distances are obtained via Google Maps API. As it
turns out, results are not very different across the two measures. Given the high prevalence
of the road transportation mode on the continent, the results reported in the paper use
driving distances. All results using straight line distances instead are available from the
25 See online at http://goo.gl/018B.
26 Another reason is the different codification of industries used in the Commodity Flow Survey. The
CFS 1993 data are STCC2-level, while the 1997 and 2002 data are SCTG2-level. We used documentation
provided by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (see http://goo.gl/NftHO) as well as expert advice from
a BTS freight specialist to establish an equivalency to NAICS3. More information on this correspondence
is available from the authors.
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authors.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
origin 9581 18.8521 17.89854 1 60 
destination 9581 18.9069 17.92069 1 60 
year 9581 1998.51 4.03042 1992 2005 
origin unemployment 9581 7.785847 3.802196 2.3 20.1 
destination unemployment 9581 7.793184 3.836815 2.3 20.1 
origin population 9581 5092836 5733661 130827 3.59e+07 
destination population 9581 5092903 5733536 130827 3.59e+07 
origin GDP 9581 1.89e+11 2.42e+11 2.35e+09 1.96e+12 
destination GDP 9581 1.89e+11 2.42e+11 2.35e+09 1.96e+12 
origin GDP (USD) 4161 255703.3 251521.6 12570 1628599 
destination GDP (USD) 4178 254797.8 251415.2 12570 1628599 
driving distance 9581 2821.966 1478.948 232.577 7396.486 
straight distance 9581 2178.645 1140.327 157.629 5490.169 
CAD/USD 9581 1.390921 .1099147 1.208341 1.570205 
USD/CAD (OECD) 9581 .8214153 .0105951 .81 .84 
USD/CAD (SNA) 9581 .8335831 .0110856 .81 .85 
origin-destination 9581 1904.117 1779.894 102 6010 
trade 9581 6.74e+08 2.70e+09 30 6.33e+10 
adjusted trade 9579 7.03e+08 2.70e+09 142.8918 6.63e+10 
interprovincial dummy 9581 .1296316 .3359152 0 1 
interstate dummy 9581 0 0 0 0 
Canadian importer 9581 .5639286 .4959222 0 1 
Canadian exporter 9581 .565703 .4956902 0 1 
 
Table 1a: Summary Statistics: Aggregated, province-province and province-state data for all years 1992-
2005. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
origin 12020 22.4173 18.54615 1 60 
destination 12020 22.41714 18.53596 1 60 
year 12020 1998.249 3.993002 1992 2005 
origin unemployment 12020 7.323527 3.558796 2.3 20.1 
destination 
unemployment 
12020 7.335291 3.585297 2.3 20.1 
origin population 12020 5653456 6075726 130827 3.59e+07 
destination population 12020 5684167 6074883 130827 3.59e+07 
origin GDP 12020 2.10e+11 2.53e+11 2.35e+09 1.96e+12 
destination GDP 12020 2.11e+11 2.53e+11 2.35e+09 1.96e+12 
origin GDP (USD) 6600 251316.6 245204.9 12570 1628599 
destination GDP (USD) 6617 252754.5 244766.1 12570 1628599 
driving distance 12020 2637.869 1478.446 113.017 7396.486 
straight distance 12020 2058.429 1143.425 105.3006 5490.169 
CAD/USD 12020 1.395039 .1114174 1.208341 1.570205 
USD/CAD (OECD) 12020 .8211631 .0101505 .81 .84 
USD/CAD (SNA) 12020 .8341373 .011437 .81 .85 
origin-destination 12020 2264.148 1849.587 102 6058 
trade 12020 1.07e+09 3.16e+09 30 6.33e+10 
adjusted trade 12018 1.10e+09 3.16e+09 142.8918 6.63e+10 
interprovincial dummy 12020 .1033278 .3043992 0 1 
interstate dummy 12020 .2029118 .4021841 0 1 
Canadian importer 12020 .4495008 .497464 0 1 
Canadian exporter 12020 .4509151 .4976055 0 1 
!
Table 2a: Summary Statistics: Aggregated, province-province, province-state and state-state data for all
years 1992-2005. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
origin 166536 21.14614 18.47989 1 60 
destination 166536 20.95033 18.47206 1 60 
NAICS 166536 314.2563 43.09635 114 339 
year 166536 1998.475 3.986495 1992 2005 
trade 166536 7.74e+07 5.48e+08 1 5.42e+10 
adjusted trade 164794 7.99e+07 5.51e+08 0 5.67e+10 
origin unemployment 166536 7.125169 3.131042 2.3 20.1 
destination unemployment 166536 7.21078 3.302486 2.3 20.1 
origin population 166536 6022709 6145684 130827 3.59e+07 
destination population 166536 5987087 6173331 130827 3.59e+07 
origin GDP 166536 2.24e+11 2.59e+11 2.35e+09 1.96e+12 
destination GDP 166536 2.24e+11 2.60e+11 2.35e+09 1.96e+12 
origin GDP (USD) 84751 273405 255339 12570 1628599 
destination GDP (USD) 83791 275934.2 257844.8 12570 1628599 
driving distance 166536 2538.874 1429.211 113.017 7396.486 
straight distance 166536 1987.856 1121.432 105.3006 5490.169 
CAD/USD 166536 1.394598 .1104137 1.208341 1.570205 
USD/CAD (OECD) 166536 .8213574 .0104158 .81 .84 
USD/CAD (SNA) 166536 .8340765 .0111695 .81 .85 
origin_destination 166536 2135.565 1840.647 102 6058 
Canadian exporter 166536 .4625126 .4985942 0 1 
Canadian importer 166536 .4968595 .4999916 0 1 
!
Table 3a: Summary Statistics: Dissaggregated (NAICS level) data for all years 1992-2005. (Source: Statis-
tics Canada, Industry Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
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 (1) 
AvW Transformation 
(2) 
Unbiased 
(origin and dest 
dummies) 
Dependent Var: 
ln(adjusted trade) / 
(ln(origin's gdp)*ln(dest's 
gdp))   
   
1993   
ln(Distance): (1-σ)ρ -1.15*** -1.17*** 
 0.04 0.04 
Border: (1-σ)lnb -1.84*** -2.01*** 
 0.06 0.08 
R-squared 0.71 0.75 
Obs 1425 1425 
   
1997   
Distance: (1-σ)ρ -1.15*** -1.23*** 
 0.04 0.04 
Border: (1-σ)lnb -1.48*** -1.75*** 
 0.06 0.06 
R-squared 0.66 0.75 
Obs 1446 1446 
   
2002   
Distance: (1-σ)ρ -1.23*** -1.29*** 
 0.04 0.04 
Border: (1-σ)lnb -1.37*** -1.71*** 
 0.06 0.06 
R-squared 0.66 0.76 
Obs 1447 1447 
 
 
Notes: Province-province and province-state trade flows included. 
Table 4a: AvWtransform and OLS Estimates of Border Effects with Multilateral Resistance Terms Controls
in Aggregate Data. (Source: Statistics Canada, Industry Canada and U.S. Census Bureau.)
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